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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
A complaint was signed in the City
court of Ogden, Utah on October 24, 1966,
charging Robert Lee Dixon with grand larceny in violation of Utah Code 76-38-4.
The matter was tried before the Honorable
Charles G. Cowley, Judge of the Second
Judicial District in and for Weber County,
State of Utah.

It was the defendant's

contention that the monetary evidence as
presented was without proper foundation
and was insufficient to support an instruct ion of grand larceny which was submitted
to the jury.

A motion for dismissal was

denied by the trial judge.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty by the jury
of the crime of grand larceny.

-2-

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of
the conviction and dismissal of the case
against him.

He seeks, in the alterna-

tive, an order for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 22, 1966, the defendant
was a patron of the Skaggs Drug Center in
Ogden, Utah.

At approximately 6:40 p.m.

the assistant store manager, Mr. Thomas
Woodside, claimed that he saw the defendant extract an undetermined number of bills
from one of the store's cash registers
after the salesgirl's attention had been
diverted.

(R.19)

After requesting the

assistance of several store employees,
Mr. Woodside approached the defendant to
demand an explanation.

(R.39)

The def-

endant took flight, but was immediately
apprehended in a vacant lot behind the
store.

(R.33)

Prior to giving chase,

--

-3Woodside instructed salesgirl Carol Bunnell
lo seal off the cash register from further
use.

(R.39)

The defendant was taken to a

storage room and detained there until police
arrived.

A search of the defendant by police

officers disclosed that he had only $5.03 in
his possession.

(R.60)

Store employees using

flashlights began an immediate search of the
vacant lot and the course of travel which the
defendant had taken (R.46-7) and, although
the defendant never left the sight of his
pursuers and was never further than 25 to 30
feet from them during his flight, a two-hour
search was unsuccessful.

(R. 75)

Several

employees began searching again at 7:00 a.m.
the following morning (R.77) and some twenty
doJl~r

bills were found approximately four

hours later.

(R.54)

A register check made

the evening of the alleged theft revealed a
5hortage of be~ween $250.00 and $270.00 (R.26
and 39), that figure being revised to $204.99
two days later.

(R.82)

Asst. Manager Richardsor

-4the amount recovered in the vacant lot

plac~a

at $180.00, but two days later the amount was
revised to $200.00, being the sum receipted
by the police.

(R. 78)

Mr. Richardson testi-

fied that upon finding the money he placed
it in the company safe, connected with a

paper clip and situated inside a pharmacy
sack.

(R.78)

At the trial he could not

identify Exhibit "A" as being the ten $20.00
bills he found.

The record conflicts as to

whether it was Assistant Manager Woodside or
Assistant Manager Richardson who took the
money from the safe and gave custody of it
to the Ogden police, however, at that time

the money was loose, necessitating the officer
to request a sack.

(R.93 and 94)

Appellant's

counsel objected to the receipt of Exhibit "A"
on the grounds of lack of a proper foundation

for the offered evidence and asked for a dismissal of the :charge of grand larceny based

on insufficient evidence, which motions were
denied.
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POINT I
THE CURRENCY SUBMITTED INTO EVIDENCE BY
'I'HE STATE WAS WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION AND
SHODLD HAVE BEEN RULED AS INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE, ELIMINATING THE INFERENCE OF GRAND
LARCENY RATHER THAN PETTIT LARCENY.
The defendant was convicted of grand
larceny after $200.00 in twenty-dollar denominations was admitted into evidence by the
trial court.

These bills purportedly were the

same bills found by Assistant Manager Richardson in a vacant lot the day following the
alleged larceny.

This court has on numerous

occasions required proper control and transportation of evidenciary material to insure
proper identification.

(See Utah Farm Bureau

Insurance Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399; 315 P.2d
277, 1957.)

In 29 Am Jur 2d § 775 it states:

"When objects, such as bullets,
specimens or parts taken from a
human body, are produced in court and
used there as an exhibit or made the
basis for the testimony or report of
an expert or officer, the identity of
the object produced with the object
taken from the body must be proved.
Proof of this identity involves showing that the thing was taken from a
particular body from which it was
supposed to be taken, and that thereafter it was properly kept and, if

-6necessary, transported and delivered
to the one who produced it at the
trial or the expert who analyzed
or examined it.
(emphasis ours)
Several apparent inconsistencies support

tne argument that these bills should have
been inadmissible as evidence.

1.

They are:

Witness Richardson testified at one

point that he placed the recovered money in

the company safe.
Richardson

(R.78)

At another point,

(referring to individuals not

disclosed in the transcript) said they took

it (the money)
safe.

upstairs and put it into the

If someone other than Richardson took

custody of the money, the person's testimony
would be necessary for the bills to be admissible into evidence.

In Clayton v. Metropol-

itan Life Ins. Co., 96 Utah 331; 85 P.2d 819
(1938),

the respondent sued his insurance

co~pany

for premiums allegedly due from an

accident policy he had purchased from the
~offipany.
~ll

The policy provided coverage for

physical injuries, but specifically ex-

c~uded injury or disability caused by disease o:

infection.

The respondent's lawn mower had

-7sLruck him in the stomach during a fall,

inju.cing his appendix which were later removed.

The insurance company attempted to

introduce a hospital record into evidence
showing the appendix to be in a diseased
condition; a pathologist's testimony confirmed the diseased condition of the appendix,
but he admitted that the appendix, wrapped in
gauze and bearing the respondent's name, had
been delivered by an undisclosed nurse.

The

Supreme Court in affirming the trial court
said:
"The district court thought the
necessary identification should be made
by the person who took the appendix from
the surgeon and delivered it to the pathclocist. Appellant declined to offer any
further testimony to identify the appendix ...
Appellant offered no explanation of why the
nurse who took the appendix from the surgeon,
wrapped and labeled it, and delivered it to
the pathologist was not called as a witness.
~:11ch a foundation based on necessity should
have been laid before the hearsay was admissi0 le."
(emphasis ours)
By analogy, the testimony of the employee
1

fuo took custody of the bills from Mr. Rich-

ardson should have been given to lay the
toundation for the admissibility of the bills
into evidence .

Furthermore, it should have

-8:,,_,.:.c1~1

established where the bills came from

that were turned over to the police officers.

unO.cr the requirements of Utah Farm Bureau
l~5ur~ncc

Co., v. Chugg, supra, the chain of

,_:0nt:col on proposed Exhibit

0een

esta.~lished

11

A 11 should have

with some certainty, to the

p0int of showing nonavailability to the safe
1

.Jj

01:hers, sealing the funds in an envelope,

or any other number of accepted methods of
evidence preservation.
2.

Richardson testified that the bills

whLch he iound, totaling $180.00, according
~o ~is

own count, were fastened with a paper

clip and placed in a pharmacy bag.

It was

employee Woodside who got the bills for the
Osd8n police, although the record is not
clear as to where he got these bills.

Further

Woodside failed to disclose the condition of
L:,1e

bills that he turned over to police
The record does disclose that two

c)i~icers.

day::; later:
(a)

The bills were not fastened with
a paper clip, but were loose.

(b)

They were not in a pharmacy bag.

-9\c)

The bills totaled $200.00.

in State v. Hall, 105 Utah 151; 139 P.2d
(1943), reversed on rehearing on other

!~8

c rou.iuS,

195 Utah 162; 145 P. 2d 494 (1944),

cefenddnt's employer had suffered separate
t~12.f-cs

co

of sparkplugs, a rare commodity due

wa~time

23, 1943.

requirements, on April 11 and May
The defendant sold an entire case

of sparkplugs to a third party for a considerreduced price and was charged with the

~bly

May 23 larceny.

The Supreme Court, in revers-

ln0 the conviction of defendant Hall, held

that:
T~1e State must definitely identify
the goods found in the defendant's
Dossession as the goods which were
c~arged to have been stolen before
the jury may draw an inference of
guilt based upon the proof of possession by the defendant of such
goods."
(emphasis ours)
11

(Dixon was not found in possession.)
The Court, therefore, refused to permit
u

conviction for the May 23 larceny where the

eviJence might have been goods from the April
11 larceny.

This Court said in State v. Laub,

102 Utah 402; 131 P.2d 805 (1942) that:

--

1

-10-

"'I'hc prosecution must show not only
by a preponderance of evidence that
a crime was committed, and that the
alleged facts and circumstances are
true, but they must also be such
~~cts and circumstances as are incompa table, upon any reasonable
hypothesis, with the innocence of
the accused, and incapable of explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis
other than the defendant's guilt."
3.

The search and discovery of the bills

by Skaggs'

personnel, together with their

subsequent revision of both the amounts mis-

sing and the amount recovered, when weighed
with their control over the evidence, raises
serious legal questions concerning the validity of the evidence in question.

Assistant

Manager Woodside testified that the defendant
never left his sight; was never farther than
25 to 30 feet from him during his flight, and
did not testify to any throwing movements
which would imply discard of the money by
defendant.

(R.27 and 34)

The path of travel

selected by the defendant was, therefore, fully
known to his pursuers.

He was captured behind

Skaggs Drug Center, three employees searched
for two hours with flashlights and failed to
discover any money,

(R.47) and the following

-11da:; c.i~1 und<::termined number of employees

again searched this area purportedly recovcr ing some twenty dollar bills four hours

"~

L~e

case of People v. Johnson, 4 Mich. '

AP?· 205; 144 N.W.2d 647 (1966), the defendc,.,;t

\;as seized by police officers in a vacant '

lot benind a business that had just been
Durglarized.

Tools belonging to the store

~2re

found nearby.

The defendant's explana-

tion

o~

his presence in the field was ex-

~~e~ely

dubious but the court nonetheless

£,;und tr,e evidence insufficient to convict

him and reversed the trial court.

In the

instctnt case, the defendant was likewise
apprehe~ded

in a vacant lot behind a place

allegedly looted.

Unlike the Johnson case,

witnesses saw every move made by the defendu~~ ~ixon.

Even though Dixon never left the

~1ght of his pursuers,

it took several

t::H<;_-Jloyees six hours to allegedly recover some
~w~nty dollar bills in a small geographical

area.

rt is submitted that under the author-

-12-

1

L.he Johnson case, the evidence was

~! '>~=

Ln~ufficient

Skaggs Drug reported a deficiency

~·_.c.

;:;,~cween

0~

che

theft.

That sum was later

downward to $204.99.

a~~~ged:y
~~l

$250.00 and $270.00 the evening

p~rported

r~vised

G

to convict Mr. Dixon.

The amount

recovered in the field was origin-

re)orted to be $180.00 but was later

L2Vised

~pw~rds

to $200.00.

These are sur-

pr .i s:;..1--,.g :;_y c..ccura te revisions when one cons 1sers

~na~

an adjacent register for the

same ?eriod shows an unexplained deficiency
0.C

:,;J~J.00.

In conclusion, it is submitted that
--:"ere was an unsatisfactory chain of control

over the evi6ence; the State failed to introdue,

into the record all those who took

possewsion of the evidence; and they failed
t ...; <.1_. ~-;close

all those who may have had access

to t,,e safe where the bills were purportedly

i ci 1. cl •

This Court has demanded control over

1 "'~u,,..._'ial

c~~e

introduced into evidence.

In the

of Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg,

-13-

su 2 rc.,

~~c

court refused to permit a blood

doctor testified he could not
whether ne personally drew
~: .c-:: sClrnp~e, that usually the labora-0 cy ~ec~nician draws the blood.
J.2:::_c~-"er could he remember to whom
c:-.e: .:,pecir:,en was given after it was
~r~w~ ... nor was there evidence that
~d~' ._;~:;ecimen was labeled or sealed
'---':~ :::_:{ so by whom before it was
:ur~e:d over to the laboratory.
C~c~r~y there is a lack of necessary
2vidence linking the sample analyzed
'.::::_ cJ.1 "che blood sample drawn f ram
·~·-,i :._::

_--~. ;::_,"-;)c;;r

~(',.·.J.gc;

~~c

...

"-o

•••

~ills

-,o-c ~.-,::_.--ch
~.-:c.

0

II

J l'•::c.

delivered to police officers

the description of the bills
Richardson.

While the bills

Iound in the field may have been placed in a
~~~2.

wrapped

nill~

t~rned

e~?~oye0
~~J
~

sealed by one employee, the

over to officers by another

were not sealed, were not wrapped,

were taken from an undisclosed source.
~e:

10

a~d

0ills were even of a different amount,

~~lv

similarity being that they were of

',·1is Court,

since State v. Hall, supra,

,-,, '-' .-e:J:used to affirm convictions where the
material introduced into evidence cannot or

--

-14-

,.,

,,.Jc.

J

to hc..ve failed even by inferance

.::_._,c,,,.._:c_:_

,•c

~~0~~r~y
l~,

Since

allegedly taken by Dixon is an

,,,,-,:;,u.-.t

,~f·'-"

identified to Jche crime.

:)2ce::(1

~rove

~~2~2fore,

all elements of the offense.
su0illitted that the convic-

:-.,-.--.o_-,:._c.. 'De reversed and the case against

~::_0.--.

::.-:: c_:_2fer;c1.:.:...-,t dismissed or ordered retried
:; ..

~

,:,.112

;J.c :..uded offense of pet tit larceny.

-- CulJ.~'l' E;.:<.::li:D J:~\ FAILING TO PROHIBIT
~ ,_-.·:._·...:_;' S AT':'ORN:i'.:Y FROM ARGUING FLIGHT BY
-- .:::_wi=-.~\·;· =~\ nIS CLOSING ARGUMENT I WHICH
.i__::c~C,~ :-:.=-.5 P;{:CJUDICIAL.

to closing arguments, and after

?r~or
-

-

-

1 - l j l1...i....

\.:0c._-,.:.,;:-~:._

-

I,_.

,-

.......

rc..u

rc.::~'-·ested,

~~~sio~
··

instructed the jury, appellant's

-~0 •

out of presence of the jury,

from the court to the State's

prohibitil;g him from arguing the

··" --·-=c"-::"" oi_ flight by defendant at the time
~,

G~

~~?roached

by store employees.

This

out of the hearing of the court
i. "-

i..Jl_1 .... LI..:)

.C

as is evidenced in the transcript

-15-

The Court denied this request

j_\)\).

State's Attorney to argue
~~

- .I.,_'

~:1~

i~fe::cnces

· •; c~.::;Jnsel

-~s~::uc~~on

\-..~.,

~,

:E~~s~-..t
,.., _,_

,,ti-=.. .... t_ •

on the basis that appel-

JI • • •

and

had not requested such

(since)

there was evidence

it could be discussed in the argu-

I I

.. ;i-;:->ellat1t. aG.mi ts that he did not tender
c.d

L"

i,-,s'~::L..c'cl.on

ot1 flight and the inference

c c: jc.::'! ri'light draw from same, but

-~2c:.c,:l.~.:.,

c·r•.,

·c>.c.c

.J.c.v2

t~'lese

·'::iee~"

i~1ferences,

if any, would

detrimental to appellant's

"--"'"" ::ieneficial to the State, who like1J.LSe

G.l.G.

:t

;-10t

instruct with such instructions.

wo~ld

a~near
...
~

that the law of the

::;cc,~-::2

o:::

C:::c:..~-,

~~g~c

~o

the Jury as in State v. Hanna, 81

~Jtc:,:--,

503;

is clear on what counsel may

21 ?.2d 537

(1933), this Court

must receive the law from
arguments in
be within the
)~ ::...:c i~::i::'..es given by the court in its
··~~c

ju~y

=~2 cac.::t and counsel's
u 0 :;~:.,2ct to the law must
~·-,~·cructions.

JI

.~~~ ~~bo People v. Fields, 277 NY2d, 1967.)

-lG-

~~~

C jurt erred in permitting a State's

.-. .:. co.:i,-::..:-/ ~o u.rgue a theory of implied guilt,

', .. , .:· .

.:...lc.~-:oc.c;:1

.~~~2c
c.u

...

a valid legal theory if sup-

the evidence and the instructions

~i

= c.ry, was not a legal theory which the

~2

consider in passing upon the guilt

·: cm1~c.::.
.,~

: _ .·"1oc2,-:.ce of the defendant without being

so

ins~ruc~ed

and was, therefore, prejudicial.
CO:l'JCLUS :!:ON

L ·.•

c.:

~)~J2=..la.r1t.

z:.. .:·~~ .-·ce:c

E~"~tc~

requests this Court to find

of law that no credible evidence

warranting submission of this case
guilt or innocence of the

--:r:c •.-,2 o:f .:;;rand larceny and requests this Court

tc

v~ca~e

r2~~~~~~g

the jury's verdict of guilty,
the case to the lower court with

~-,.-u::~in°;.s,

either finding that Exhibit

11

A 11

-" or ordering the grand
rse be dismissed, based on the lack
v~~~nce ~efore

~c i s

the court, and if the def-

retried, it be on the issue of pettit
Appellant further requests a

-17;\·~:···"'
-~

, __) - t_, _,

~o

1

o:::: t"t1e jury verdict because of the

uaice of the Scate's Attorney's argument

c.-.::

1 u ~'!

011

c.. legal theory not within the

of the Court's instructions
Respectfully submitted
~~=.:.o. TCH

& .McRAE

for Appellant
707 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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